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A TRIBUTE TO THE IMAGINATIVE CREATIVITY
OF ROGER TRAYNOR
Fleming James, Jr.*
IT is fitting that this products liability issue of the Hofstra
Law Review is dedicated to Roger Traynor. He is one of the great
judges and among the great legal thinkers of our time. He has
made contributions to many subjects, but the ones I know best
are those in the field of torts and here some of the most notable
have dealt with products liability.
In this fast-moving area Roger Traynor has been a leader,
often ahead of his time. I remember well his landmark concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company,' decided in
1944. The holding of the court extended res ipsa loquitur to the
case of an exploding bottle. Justice Traynor agreed, but would
have gone further: "In my opinion it should now be recognized
that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings."'2 There follows one of the best and clearest argu-
ments for this position that has ever been written. No one who
reads it for the first time today can capture the excitement my
generation of lawyers felt on reading it. Its result, its reasoning,
and many of its passages soon became a familiar part of the legal
literature because of Roger Traynor's insights and gift for lucid
and pungent expression. Today's reader is likely to react a little
like the man who was disappointed in Shakespeare because that
worthy author used so many trite sayings with which the reader
had been brought up.
By the time Justice Traynor wrote the opinion in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,3 the law of products liability had
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come a long way-in the direction forecast by him in Escola. The
manufacturer's strict liability to the injured consumer had begun
to gain recognition on a wide front, but its traditional vehicle was
warranty. Now the law of warranty was the product of commer-
cial transactions and it had become more or less assimilated into
the law of contract. Not surprisingly, therefore, warranty law was
beset with conditions and limitations which made sense in a com-
mercial context, but which were quite out of place among rules
for the protection and compensation of those who were hurt phys-
ically by defective products. With pragmatic common sense some
courts recognized this and found means of getting around the
most troublesome warranty limitations, but this took an astute-
ness and a willingness to manipulate legal doctrine which other
courts lacked or from which they shied away. A few commenta-
tors4 urged a clean break with warranty and a frank recognition
of strict liability in tort.
The decision in Greenman was the first full judicial accept-
ance of this notion; appropriately, it came from the judge who
had urged it in dictum twenty years before. Since Greenman,
strict liability in tort has been widely acclaimed by courts and
commentators. It is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.5 It does not, however, solve all problems. No one contends
for instance that the publisher of a book is liable for the death of
a person who trips over it at the head of an unlighted flight of
stairs and breaks his neck in the fall. There is no liability unless
the product is in some way defective or unreasonably dangerous.
The Restatement dealt with this problem, but Justice Traynor
was not altogether satisfied with its proposals and gave perhaps
the best and most thoughtful treatment of the subject in a lecture
at the seventy-fifth anniversary program of the University of Ten-
nessee College of Law in 1965.6 Here the problems of serum hepa-
titis, of allergies, of drugs, of cigarettes, and of the effect of warn-
ings are all perceptively analyzed. The Restatement's "unavoida-
4. Dean Prosser was the leader among them. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 97, 98 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.15-28.22
(1956) (in which this author also perceived but "through a glass, darkly").
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A and Comments and Illustrations. See also
id. Appendix.
6. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. Rav. 363 (1965). Justice Traynor's disenchantment with the Restatement's "un-
reasonable danger" requirement was apparently rectified by the California Supreme Court
subsequent to his retirement from the Bench. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
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bly unsafe products" concept 7 comes in for its share of criticism:
"If a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is
ironic to exempt the manufacturer from liability on the ground
that any other sample of his product would produce like harm." 8
And we are cautioned against accepting the Restatement's
overuse of assumption of risk:9 "Emphasis on generic qualities, or
what the Restatement views as commonly contemplated charac-
teristics, should not afford a basis for charging the consumer with
assumption of the risk of the harm some products cause. Were a
consumer deemed to assume all commonly known risks, we would
come full circle round to the problems generated by the dis-
claimer of warranty in implied warranty cases."' "
Not all of Justice Traynor's views on products liability have
favored its expansion. The mark of a great judge in times of
transition is what Robert Keeton has felicitously called creative
continuity." The best common law tradition stresses continuity
even in making change, and this calls for discrimination. In
Greenman, the inappropriateness of applying commercial war-
ranty law to the problem of physical injuries from defective prod-
ucts was clearly seen, but that did not lead Justice Traynor to
pull warranty out by the roots, so to speak. In Seely v. White
Motor Co.,12 he recognized that"[a]lthough the rules governing
warranties complicated resolution of the problems of personal
injuries, there is no reason to conclude that they do not meet the'needs of commercial transactions.' 13
"A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manu-
facturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a
product on the market. He can, however, fairly be charged with
the risk that the product will not match his economic expecta-
tions unless the manufacturer agrees that it will."' 4 If this were
not so, Justice Traynor pointed out, the "manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope,"' 5 since he
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 402A, Comment k.
8. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, supra
note 6, at 368.
9. For criticism of this overuse see James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy
Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
10. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
supra note 6, at 371.
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13. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
14. Id. at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
15. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
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may not limit his strict liability in tort.
In the Seely opinion Justice Traynor discriminates nicely
between the roles legal doctrines are called upon to play in differ-
ent factual contexts; this is the antithesis of mechanical juris-
prudence. The opinion also shows a fine appreciation of the dis-
tinction between the proper roles of court and legislature. When
these qualities are combined with imaginative creativity as they
are in Roger Traynor, the result is excellence.
